12 January 1999

Posted on January 12, 2021January 30, 2021 by William Arkin

After the December 1998 decision was made not to use Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles in a strike in Afghanistan to target Osama bin Laden in Kandahar (fear of civilian collateral damage being the most important factor in rejecting the missiles), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Henry (“Hugh”) Shelton directs the development of a new plan that would use an AC-130 gunship to assassinate bin Laden and be used in other retaliatory strikes. (911 Commission, p. 134)

The aircraft, operated by Air Force Special Operations Command, would in theory be able to use its cannons to inflict a more precise and intense attack. The precision of AC-130 gunships would later become a major factor in collateral-damage incidents during the Afghanistan war (and later in Iraq), as the aircraft proved not to be quite as precise as advertised. But more important, the special operations asset’s attacks and record get buried in official secrecy, the plane never being scrutinized alongside fighter aircraft and bombers.

22 November 1988

Posted on November 22, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

Northrop’s B-2A “stealth” bomber is rolled out of its hanger at Air Force Plant 42 in Palmdale, California, showcased to the public for the first time.

“We are not just rolling out America’s newest strategic bomber,” said Air Force Secretary Edward C. Aldridge Jr. “We are ushering in a new age of strategic deterrence.” Should deterrence fail, the theory at the time went, the bombers would fly into Soviet airspace undaunted by air defenses, seeking out and destroying surviving nuclear forces.

Of course the B-2 would go on to be used in Kosovo in 1999, where the hyperbole of its prowess—and its ability to evade Serbian air defenses—would match the pretenses of Bill Clinton’s war: bombing with minimum vulnerability of U.S. military personnel. After 9/11, the B-2 would also be extensively used in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, joining the general bombing campaigns, but never challenged by any air-defense threat. And that’s the thing about the B-2 as it ends in 30-plus year lifespan (to be followed by a new bomber, the B-21)—with satellite-guided bombs and a host of new techniques to disable enemy air defenses, it is an extremely expensive way to bomb, at least with conventional weapons.

18 November 1998

Posted on November 18, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

The CIA issues a compartmented top-secret report, “Further Options Available Against UBL” [Osama bin Laden], outlining covert and military actions that could be taken as a follow-on to the August 1998 cruise missile attacks (that were retaliation for the African embassy bombings).

White House staffers were still arguing for bombing a broad range of sites that would include al Qaeda camps and Taliban facilities in Afghanistan. Beyond air defenses and airfields, the Air Force said there weren’t any easy targets—that is, those which were outside urban areas or whose destruction would have significant effects. And the terrorist camps themselves were spread out and lacked critical facilities. Bomb damage assessments of the August strikes indicated no long-term effect.

According to Age of Sacred Terror (p. 284), national security advisor Sandy Berger was leery of bombing alone, believing that the odds of killing Osama bin Laden were low “and that a failure would make the United States look impotent and its target invincible.”

JCS Chairman Gen. Hugh Shelton presented other military options, but his “$2 billion option” as the White House called it, was seen more as passive-aggressive refusal on the part of the Pentagon to engage in combat, piling on logistical and support requirements that turned every option into a major war. Secretary of Defense William Cohen also insisted that any special operations option—even of a small stealthy raid—include a “force protection” package. Ultimately the discussions fizzled into nothing.

30 September 2000

Posted on September 30, 2020September 30, 2020 by William Arkin

The Taliban issue a press statement saying that an unknown aircraft was seen over Kandahar. CIA-operated Predator drones had started flights over Afghanistan on September 7, flying from an airfield in Uzbekistan.

The satellite-equipped, bulbous-nosed RQ-1 Predator (an enhanced version of the CIA’s Gnat-750) was a newer innovation that allowed the drone to fly beyond the line of sight of ground stations controlling the drones. A year after the satellite-version was introduced, the drone made its first combat debut in hostile airspace, flying near-daily reconnaissance missions over former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Kosovo), then flying from an airfield in Albania.

In December 1998, the CIA first proposed a covert action to use an armed Predator to assassinate Osama bin Laden. Director George Tenet thought the program too risky to be approved on his authority alone and he brought it before the NSC for discussion. The Council gave a go-ahead for development of the capability, but the White House decided to retain control over authorizations for any lethal strikes. Predator development continued to move forward. Flights over Afghanistan are only occasional in September 2000 as the testing program to fire a Hellfire missile from the drone moves forward under Air Force aegis in Nevada. Despite the conclusion that the Predator spotted bin Laden in its first flights (see September 28), the 12-flight covert action is terminated before the end of the year. Predators would not return to the skies of Afghanistan until after 9/11.