20 December 2000

Posted on December 20, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

A grand jury in the Southern District of New York (SDNY) returns an indictment against five additional suspects in the case of the United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al. The five suspects—Saif Al-Adel, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah (Abu Muhammad al-Masri), Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah, Ahmed Mohamed Hamed Ali, and Anas Al-Libi—are charged in the overall conspiracy, led by al Qaeda, to kill U.S. nationals and engage in other illegal acts.

In addition, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah is charged for his role as the mastermind of the August 7, 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah was gunned down on the streets of Tehran in August 2020.

Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah was killed in an airstrike or drone strike in October 2006.

Ahmed Mohamed Hamed Ali was killed in a drone strike in 2010.

Anas al-Libi was captured by operators of the Joint Special Operations Command in Libya on October 5, 2013. Ten days later, he appeared in Manhattan federal court and pled not guilty to terrorism charges. His trial was scheduled for January 2015, but he died just before it began in a New York hospital.

Saif al-Adel, if alive, is still at large 20 years later.

16 December 1994

Posted on December 16, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law is arrested in Morgan Hill, California.

Muhammed Jamal A. Khalifa, a Saudi, is arrested by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. He had been sentenced to death in Jordan for plotting to assassinate Jordanian government officials and planting bombs in two movie theaters, explosions which injured 11 people. He had entered the U.S. on December 1.

Khalifa (aka Jalal Khalifat, Gamal Khalifat, Mohammad J.A. Khalifah, Jamal Khalifah, Abdallah Khalifah Abu Bara, Abudul Barashid, Abu Salah), born 1 February 1957 in Medina, Saudi Arabia, is thought to be the brother-in-law to Osama bin Laden. (One of his four wives is a sister of bin Laden). He is believed at the time to have been living for the previous six or more years in Manila, and to be the leader of a terrorist cell in the Philippines (and involved in the so-called “Bojinka” plotting to kill the Pope and bomb U.S. airliners.)

Khalifa was deported in May to Jordan but was later acquitted of all charges and allowed to return to Saudi Arabia. The famed “28 pages” from the 9/11 Commission later speculates that the Saudis “bought off” the Jordanians for the return of Khalifa. As the report states, “Khalifa now works for a Riyadh-based NGO and travels and operates freely.”

8 December 2000

Posted on December 8, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

Hani Hanjour, pilot of the plane that attacked the Pentagon, arrives in San Diego, California from Dubai (via Paris and Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport).

The Saudi is sent to San Diego by al Qaeda to pick up Nawaf al-Hazmi—part of the San Diego duo of Khalid al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, the original two planes’ operatives sent to the United States in January 2000. They had been picked as pilots by Osama bin Laden, but neither managed to obtain pilots licenses, and Mihdhar left the U.S. six months later (only to return in July 2001). Nawaf, who could not speak English, needed a chaperone, as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed feared that his closeness to the Muslim community ran the risk of exposing him, not to the FBI but to Saudi intelligence.

Hanjour, the only hijacker/pilot with experience in the United States, then drives with al-Hazmi to Arizona, where he had previously lived, and undertakes additional flight training to brush up on his skills. The two then relocate to Northern Virginia.

7 December 2000

Posted on December 7, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

CIA director George Tenet gives a presentation on “What U.S. Intelligence Does for You” at a town hall in Los Angeles. The Millennium threat scare and the Y2K rollover now behind the threat watchers, Tenet is all swagger and promotion.

“We have, since July 1998,” Tenet boasted, “in partnership with governments around the world, helped deliver to justice more than two dozen terrorists—more than half of whom were linked to Usama bin Laden. These actions have shattered terrorist cells and networks, disrupted terrorist plans, and—in some cases—prevented terrorist attacks from taking place.”

It is a speech that one gets the sense could be delivered any day or any year, that typical happy talk of government which pretends real progress, and even resolution of problems, when in fact there is no true progress towards eliminating terrorism or even diminishing the size of the terrorist armies that would wish us harm.

6 December 1999

Posted on December 6, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

Further increasing the level of anxiety about terrorist attacks during the Millennium transition, Jordanian authorities arrest 16 alleged terrorists who were accused of planning attacks on the John the Baptist’s shrine on the Jordan River and the Radisson SAS hotel in Amman. George Tenet later wrote: “The Jordanian intelligence service, through its able chief, Samikh Battikhi, told us that individuals on the team had direct links to Usama bin Ladin.” (At the Center of the Storm, p. 125)

The CIA Counterterrorist Center circulates an intelligence report, according to Tenet: “accepting the theory that UBL [Osama bin Laden] wants to inflict maximum casualties, cause massive panic, and score a psychological victory, then UBL may be seeking to attack between 5 and 15 targets on the Millennium. Because the U.S. is UBL’s ultimate goal… we must assume that several of these targets will be in the U.S. …”

Over the next weeks, the CIA and allied intelligence services would launch operations in 55 countries against 38 separate targets to disrupt plots in the making and to arrest terrorists under surveillance. But there is no question that once the Millennium passed without incident, the intensity of these efforts would generally decline. And they had little impact on al Qaeda central.

Of note, the same Radisson hotel was one of three hotels in Amman later attacked within a half an hour of each other on the night on November 9, 2005. There, suicide bombers killed over 50 and wounded over 100.

30 November 1999

Posted on November 30, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

The so-called “Millennium Plot” is first detected, leading to the arrest of numerous plotters in Amman, Jordan. Jordanian intelligence uncovered the al Qaeda plot to attack the Radisson Hotel as well as other sites on the night of December 31/January 1, linking local extremists to Abu Zubaydah, an al Qaeda operative then-considered to be Osama bin Laden’s top terrorist planner.

When Zubaydah was apprehended in Pakistan in 2002 (and severely injured in a fire fight), he was characterized as “chief of operations” for al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden’s “number three” with the assumption that he was the main 9/11 planner. He wasn’t of course—that was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. But he would go on to be the first captive to be water boarded and tortured at CIA black sites.

As an interesting aside: after 9/11, many would report that Abu Zubaydah made a mistake and said in an intercepted telephone call that “the grooms are ready for the big wedding,” a tip-off which U.S. intelligence had already determined was a reference to an attack. (The Cell, p. 214) The 9/11 Commission reported, though, that Zubaydah actually said “the time for training is over.” (9/11 Commission, pp. 174–175).

Somehow then—and even now—terrorism experts think it is effective to stress that al Qaeda operatives make mistakes, or they don’t understand Islam, or were “failures”—such as that the Hamburg Three did poorly in pilot training—to delegitimize when none of those things seem to make a bit of difference in their ability and willingness to continue to attack. Nor do they dissuade others from joining their ranks.

29 November 1999

Posted on November 29, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

Mohammed Atta travels from Hamburg, Germany to Karachi, Pakistan via Istanbul, spending the night in Turkey. Despite the African embassy bombings in August 1998, American military retaliation, and CIA covert operations, he and his compatriots have no trouble reaching Afghanistan.

Atta is already the leader of the Hamburg Four, and together with Marwan al-Shehhi, Ziad Jarrah, and Ramzi Binalshibh, they travel to Kandahar and then on to Khalden camp, where they meet with the al Qaeda operational commander Abu Hafs (Mohammed Atef) and Osama bin Laden. Abu Hafs spotted them immediately as special, according to various accounts, especially the three who would go on to pilot the 9/11 planes (Atta, al-Shehhi and Jarrah). They were educated, had technical skills, could speak English, and had learned how to live in the West. They also came from countries—Egypt, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates—where they wouldn’t have trouble obtaining U.S. visas. By the time they leave Afghanistan, they have their broad assignments.

25 November 1999

Posted on November 25, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

The “Hamburg Four” begin their journey to join al Qaeda, ultimately being assigned to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s “planes operation.”

Ziad Jarrah flies from Hamburg, Germany to Karachi, Pakistan via Istanbul, on Turkish Airlines flight 1662 and the 1056, the first of the “Hamburg Four” to fly to Afghanistan. He stays in Pakistan for two months.

According to the interrogations of Ramzi Binalshibh, one of the four (and now in Guantanamo), sometime in 1999, the four decided to act on their beliefs and to pursue jihad against the Russians in Chechnya. They were advised that it was difficult to get to Chechnya and that they should go to Afghanistan first. The four then traveled separately to Quetta in Pakistan, meeting with a trusted representative, who arranged their passage to Kandahar.

In Afghanistan, the four have an audience with Osama bin Laden and pledge loyalty, knowing that they were volunteering for a martyrdom operation. They were instructed to enroll in flight training. Mohammed Atta was chosen to lead the group, and before they left Afghanistan, he met with bin Laden and received a preliminary list of targets: the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and the U.S. Capitol. (See 911 Commission, p. 166; 911 Commission, Staff Statement 16, p. 3)

20 November 1979

Posted on November 20, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

An obscure but seminal event occurs, when a group of Saudi dissidents—alternately called “Sunni Muslims,” “Muslim fundamentalists,” “Shi’a vermin from Hasa,” and even “foreign agents”—attack the Grand Mosque of Mecca, Islam’s holiest site.

Entering the walls of the mosque, some 200 rebels, mostly Saudis, but including Egyptians, Kuwaitis, Yemenis and Pakistanis take thousands hostage and barricade themselves inside. They call for the overthrow of the pro-Western Saudi government. It is an unprecedented event in Saudi history and the first mega-action by Islamic fundamentalists. And it is a seminal event for a young Osama bin Laden, who was reportedly shocked into a political awakening, one that became even more stark when a month later, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, while the standoff between Saudi forces and the hostage takers was still going on.

After two weeks of negotiating, sniping and fighting, Saudi Arabia secretly brought in French counter-terrorism commandos to aid in a final assault on the mosque. The hostage takers and the hostages had moved underground into tunnels and catacombs. Reportedly using chemicals, the combined Saudi and French force mounted a final assault. Some 250 people were killed and 600 were wounded, and the battle left at least 25 Saudi soldiers and more than 100 rebels dead. After it was all over, some 65 rebels were publicly beheaded.

During the siege, thousands of Saudi Shi’a living in the eastern provinces took to the streets, inspired by the Grand Mosque attack. Riots broke out and Aramco facilities were attacked. It took Saudi authorities until mid-January to subdue the uprising.

An interesting outcome of the assault on the Grand Mosque is that the Saudi monarchy adopted conservative Wahhabism as the official ideology of the state, essentially implementing many of the positions of the insurgents. Women are prohibited from driving or appearing on television, music is forbidden, all stores and malls are closed during the five daily prayers. A royal decree also says that there were to be “no limits … put on expenditures for the propagation of Islam.” Saudi Arabia becomes—and is—the problem and the birthplace of 9/11.

18 November 1998

Posted on November 18, 2020December 23, 2020 by William Arkin

The CIA issues a compartmented top-secret report, “Further Options Available Against UBL” [Osama bin Laden], outlining covert and military actions that could be taken as a follow-on to the August 1998 cruise missile attacks (that were retaliation for the African embassy bombings).

White House staffers were still arguing for bombing a broad range of sites that would include al Qaeda camps and Taliban facilities in Afghanistan. Beyond air defenses and airfields, the Air Force said there weren’t any easy targets—that is, those which were outside urban areas or whose destruction would have significant effects. And the terrorist camps themselves were spread out and lacked critical facilities. Bomb damage assessments of the August strikes indicated no long-term effect.

According to Age of Sacred Terror (p. 284), national security advisor Sandy Berger was leery of bombing alone, believing that the odds of killing Osama bin Laden were low “and that a failure would make the United States look impotent and its target invincible.”

JCS Chairman Gen. Hugh Shelton presented other military options, but his “$2 billion option” as the White House called it, was seen more as passive-aggressive refusal on the part of the Pentagon to engage in combat, piling on logistical and support requirements that turned every option into a major war. Secretary of Defense William Cohen also insisted that any special operations option—even of a small stealthy raid—include a “force protection” package. Ultimately the discussions fizzled into nothing.