Five months after the African embassy bombings, the CIA issues its first major analytic report—“How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist Network” on the nature of al Qaeda, that it is present in some 60 countries.

“Usama bin Laden is the ultimate decisionmaker in the organization,” the classified report states. “He is directly involved in the planning of terrorist operations and oversees those in his group responsible for terrorism even when he is one step removed from the details.”

The report relies heavily on arrests made after the African bombings, as well as the defection of Jamal al-Fadl and the arrest of Khalid Fawwaz, bin Laden’s news media representative in London.

It concludes that the organization is capable of undertaking more than one terrorist operation simultaneously.

Mary Anne Weaver writes in The New Yorker that Washington has “mythologized” Osama bin Laden. She writes: “Each time the Clinton administration raises the stakes, and further enhances bin Laden’s prominence, more and more disaffected Saudis flock to join the kingdom’s military Islamist underground, of which bin Laden remains a central part. That is one of the most worrisome consequences of America’s obsession with one man.”

The obsession theme, and the parade of journalists and experts who would downplay bin Laden, al Qaeda, and the threat of terrorism is not new. In March 1997, The New Republic printed an article by Susan Ellingwood entitled “Hot Air” that mocked the Clinton administration’s attempts to strengthen airport security, calling it an absurd waste of money.

In August 1998, former CIA officer Milton Bearden penned an op-ed in The New York Times arguing that Osama bin Laden has been “blown out of proportion.”

“One might argue that the following of Osama bin Laden that has been created by the romantic mythology has become more dangerous than the man himself,” Bearden writes.

In June 2000, writing in The Washington Post in response to the National Commission on Terrorism Report, former State Department counter-terrorism official Larry C. Johnson also says that more Americans have died from scorpion bites than from foreign terrorist attacks over the past five years, calling the Commission’s description of the terrorism threat “vastly exaggerated.”

In November 2000, Bearden and Johnson banded together to write in The Los Angeles that “American attempts to blast Usama bin Laden out of his Afghan redoubt have elevated him to levels of mystical power in the Islamic world.”

On May 31, 2001, Benjamin Weiser writes in The New York Times (“Trial Poked Holes in Image of bin Laden’s Terror Group”) about how al Qaeda is not all that fearsome. Osama bin Laden “loomed large” before the African embassy bombings trial, Weiser writes, “because so little was known about how he worked.”

“But the trial … made clear that while Mr. Bin Laden may be a global menace, his group, Al Qaeda, was at times slipshod, torn by inner strife, betrayal, greed and the banalities of life that one might find in any office.”

On July 10, 2001, Johnson was back in The New York Times: “The overall terrorist threat trend is down … Nor are the United States and its policies the primary target … The greatest risk clear: if you are drilling for oil in Colombia—or in nations like Ecuador, Nigeria or Indonesia—you should take appropriate precautions; otherwise Americans have little to fear.”

 

Osama bin Laden is indicted—the most complete federal indictment to date, including 11 other suspected members of al Qaeda. The twelve are charged with conspiring to murder American citizens. Al Qaeda’s objectives, according to the indictment, include: killing members of the American military stationed in Saudi Arabia (1995 and 1996) and Somalia (1991 and 1992); killing United States embassy employees in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (August 1998); and “concealing the activities of the co-conspirators by, among other things, establishing front companies, providing false identity and travel documents, engaging in coded correspondence, and providing false information to the authorities in various countries.”

The indictment also says: “USAMA BIN LADEN, the defendant, and al Qaeda also forged alliances with the National Islamic Front in the Sudan and with representatives of the government of Iran, and its associated terrorist group Hizballah …”

And that “… al Qaeda (and the affiliated Egyptian Islamic Jihad) sent some of its members to Lebanon to receive training from members of the terrorist group Hizballah.”

 

The special Osama bin Laden virtual station inside the CIA Counterterrorism Center (CTC) gets underway. The “virtual” station is similar to the virtual Iran station (located in Frankfurt, Germany) that was created because of an inability to have an actual physical station in Tehran.

But because the bin Laden “station” is not about a country, and it is in the backwater of the then secondary and unimportant counterterrorism portfolio, few pay much attention. If anything, it even has an opposite effect. Rather than creating a bin Laden czar who focuses the Agency’s attention, it is seen as a hotbed of obsessed extremists focused on a questionable threat. That legacy would persist even through CIA director Tenet’s December 1998 declaration of war against al Qaeda and up until 9/11—the station an epicenter of analysis (and obsession), but the actual action regarding countering bin Laden taking place in the physical Pakistan and Uzbekistan stations (and in Yemen and other country stations) where covert action is being undertaken.

AC-130 plane

 

After the December 1998 decision was made not to use Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles in a strike in Afghanistan to target Osama bin Laden in Kandahar (fear of civilian collateral damage being the most important factor in rejecting the missiles), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Henry (“Hugh”) Shelton directs the development of a new plan that would use an AC-130 gunship to assassinate bin Laden and be used in other retaliatory strikes. (911 Commission, p. 134)

The aircraft, operated by Air Force Special Operations Command, would in theory be able to use its cannons to inflict a more precise and intense attack. The precision of AC-130 gunships would later become a major factor in collateral-damage incidents during the Afghanistan war (and later in Iraq), as the aircraft proved not to be quite as precise as advertised. But more important, the special operations asset’s attacks and record get buried in official secrecy, the plane never being scrutinized alongside fighter aircraft and bombers.

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed

 

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind behind 9/11, is identified by an al Qaeda captive from a photograph and labeled an “associate” of Osama bin Laden.

He is subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury the next month. The FBI and U.S. Attorney do not really know who KSM is, other than as a financier of the 1993 World Trade Center attack and an accomplice in Ramzi Yousef’s activities in the Philippines. The indictment is sealed—secret—only to be opened once KSM is in custody.

Gold Mohur Hotel

 

Probably the “first” direct attack by al Qaeda on the United States occurs in Yemen.

Two hotels that cater to westerners are attacked, one at the Movenpick and the other at the Gold Mohur. Though directed at U.S. military personnel staging for operations in Somalia, the bombs kill one Australian tourist. In fact, the U.S. military are staying at a completely different hotel and the attack is barely noticed in Washington.

Two Yemenis, later found to have trained in Afghanistan, are eventually arrested, having been injured in the blast. Osama bin Laden claimed responsibility for the attack in 1998.

NSA

 

NSA reportedly begins placing caveats on certain raw Osama bin Ladin intercepts that precludes automatic sharing of the contents with the FBI or U.S. Attorneys.

These controls over dissemination were initially created at the direction of Attorney General Janet Reno, and applied solely to intelligence gathered as a result of three specific domestic-related intercepts that she had authorized. Because NSA decided it was administratively too difficult to determine whether particular intelligence derived from these specific surveillances was contained in finished reports, the NSA also decided to control dissemination of all its bin Laden related reports.

In November 2000, in response to direction from the FISA Court, NSA modified these caveats to require that NSA’s Customer Needs and Delivery Services group could make exceptions to share the resulting intelligence with prosecutors and FBI agents. This episode is often confused with the larger question of FBI and CIA sharing—the so-called “wall”—but really it’s related to intelligence from three al Qaeda suspect intercepts.

 

Osama bin Laden meets with a Time Magazine correspondent at his tented encampment in Afghanistan’s Helmand province.

“Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so,” he says, referring to nuclear weapons.

George Tenet later testifies before the 9/11 Commission that that the CIA took notice of this December statement and sent out a warning regarding al Qaeda’s interest “in acquiring chemical and biological weapons and nuclear materials.”

South Yemen

 

Osama bin Laden approaches Prince Turki bin Faisal al Saud, head of the intelligence services of Saudi Arabia, with a plan to use Arab mujahedin from Afghanistan to overthrow the Marxist government in South Yemen.

Turki rejects his proposal, but bin Laden reportedly organizes fighters anyhow under the al Qaeda flag, and then (working with tribal leaders) makes a series of attacks in South Yemen. The attacks are so damaging and threatening that Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh travels to Saudi Arabia to ask King Fahd to get bin Laden under control. The King then himself instructs bin Laden to stay out of Yemeni affairs, and Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz al Saud (then the minister of the interior) demands bin Laden’s passport.

Less than a year later, Iraq invades Kuwait and bin Laden’s views of Saudi Arabia are forever transformed, with King Fahd inviting U.S. military forces to deploy to Saudi soil—a sacrilege to bin Laden that represents a new set of “crusaders” entering the lands of Islam.