In Dubai, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (Ammar al-Baluchi) deposits $5,000 into the Citibank account of Saudi Hani Hanjour. Hanjour, who would fly the plane into the Pentagon on 9/11, was the last of the four pilots to come onboard with the plot and the only Saudi amongst the pilots.

Aziz Ali, a nephew of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (and often called “Cousin Ali” by the other hijackers, was located in the United Arab Emirates, and thus was the secure (and less suspicious) financial link between al Qaeda and the hijackers in the United States (rather than KSM in Pakistan).

He was captured in a police raid in Karachi, Pakistan on April 30, 2003, and is now in Guantanamo Bay detention camp.

Mary Anne Weaver writes in The New Yorker that Washington has “mythologized” Osama bin Laden. She writes: “Each time the Clinton administration raises the stakes, and further enhances bin Laden’s prominence, more and more disaffected Saudis flock to join the kingdom’s military Islamist underground, of which bin Laden remains a central part. That is one of the most worrisome consequences of America’s obsession with one man.”

The obsession theme, and the parade of journalists and experts who would downplay bin Laden, al Qaeda, and the threat of terrorism is not new. In March 1997, The New Republic printed an article by Susan Ellingwood entitled “Hot Air” that mocked the Clinton administration’s attempts to strengthen airport security, calling it an absurd waste of money.

In August 1998, former CIA officer Milton Bearden penned an op-ed in The New York Times arguing that Osama bin Laden has been “blown out of proportion.”

“One might argue that the following of Osama bin Laden that has been created by the romantic mythology has become more dangerous than the man himself,” Bearden writes.

In June 2000, writing in The Washington Post in response to the National Commission on Terrorism Report, former State Department counter-terrorism official Larry C. Johnson also says that more Americans have died from scorpion bites than from foreign terrorist attacks over the past five years, calling the Commission’s description of the terrorism threat “vastly exaggerated.”

In November 2000, Bearden and Johnson banded together to write in The Los Angeles that “American attempts to blast Usama bin Laden out of his Afghan redoubt have elevated him to levels of mystical power in the Islamic world.”

On May 31, 2001, Benjamin Weiser writes in The New York Times (“Trial Poked Holes in Image of bin Laden’s Terror Group”) about how al Qaeda is not all that fearsome. Osama bin Laden “loomed large” before the African embassy bombings trial, Weiser writes, “because so little was known about how he worked.”

“But the trial … made clear that while Mr. Bin Laden may be a global menace, his group, Al Qaeda, was at times slipshod, torn by inner strife, betrayal, greed and the banalities of life that one might find in any office.”

On July 10, 2001, Johnson was back in The New York Times: “The overall terrorist threat trend is down … Nor are the United States and its policies the primary target … The greatest risk clear: if you are drilling for oil in Colombia—or in nations like Ecuador, Nigeria or Indonesia—you should take appropriate precautions; otherwise Americans have little to fear.”

President George W. Bush takes the oath of office. The “compassionate conservative” vows to lead “through civility, courage, compassion and character.”

The former Texas governor had been briefed by the outgoing Clinton administration about the threat from al Qaeda, and while most of the principals in the new administration thought the fixation on terrorism “odd” (Against all Enemies, p. 226), in truth, the new team had an ABC policy: “Anything But Clinton.”

During the campaign, Condoleezza Rice argued in an article in Foreign Affairs that a new foreign policy was required that “separates the important from the trivial.” She took the Clinton administration to task for having “assiduously avoided implementing such an agenda.” Terrorism, she contended, only needed attending to insofar as it was used by rogue states to advance their interests.

Richard Clarke and his counter-terrorism staff was kept on, National Security Advisor Rice admitting that the Bush team was more focused on Cold War issues. Clarke was demoted and would eventually be seen as a pest, constantly promoting warnings and crisis. By the time summer rolled in, most in the administration had grown tired of the chicken littles constantly warning of upcoming terrorist attacks.

 

The Egyptian national Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman (the “Blind Sheikh”), a resident of Brooklyn, is sentenced to life in prison for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center and the Landmarks Case—or the so-called “days of terror” attacks, the spring 1993 conspiracy to attack multiple buildings and tunnels in New York City.

Together with nine other defendants who do not enter in plea agreements with the government, Abdel-Rahman is sentence to life in prison for “sedition.” It is the end of active plotting in the New York area, most of it only ever tentatively connected to al Qaeda, but the beginning of the era of “homegrown violent extremists.”

 

Osama bin Laden is indicted—the most complete federal indictment to date, including 11 other suspected members of al Qaeda. The twelve are charged with conspiring to murder American citizens. Al Qaeda’s objectives, according to the indictment, include: killing members of the American military stationed in Saudi Arabia (1995 and 1996) and Somalia (1991 and 1992); killing United States embassy employees in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (August 1998); and “concealing the activities of the co-conspirators by, among other things, establishing front companies, providing false identity and travel documents, engaging in coded correspondence, and providing false information to the authorities in various countries.”

The indictment also says: “USAMA BIN LADEN, the defendant, and al Qaeda also forged alliances with the National Islamic Front in the Sudan and with representatives of the government of Iran, and its associated terrorist group Hizballah …”

And that “… al Qaeda (and the affiliated Egyptian Islamic Jihad) sent some of its members to Lebanon to receive training from members of the terrorist group Hizballah.”

 

The special Osama bin Laden virtual station inside the CIA Counterterrorism Center (CTC) gets underway. The “virtual” station is similar to the virtual Iran station (located in Frankfurt, Germany) that was created because of an inability to have an actual physical station in Tehran.

But because the bin Laden “station” is not about a country, and it is in the backwater of the then secondary and unimportant counterterrorism portfolio, few pay much attention. If anything, it even has an opposite effect. Rather than creating a bin Laden czar who focuses the Agency’s attention, it is seen as a hotbed of obsessed extremists focused on a questionable threat. That legacy would persist even through CIA director Tenet’s December 1998 declaration of war against al Qaeda and up until 9/11—the station an epicenter of analysis (and obsession), but the actual action regarding countering bin Laden taking place in the physical Pakistan and Uzbekistan stations (and in Yemen and other country stations) where covert action is being undertaken.

 

Marwan al-Shehhi (Mohammed Atta’s partner, and the pilot of the plane that would fly into the South Tower of the World Trade Center) takes an unexplained eight-day sojourn to Casablanca, Morocco.

Al-Shehhi flies from Tampa, Florida, to New York on Delta Flight 2522, and then on to Casablanca on Royal Air Maroc Flight 205. His trip followed Atta returning to Florida from his own foreign trip. The 9/11 Commission (Staff Statement 16, p. 7) doesn’t speculate about the reason for al-Shehhi’s trip, but it thought that perhaps he was seeking medical treatment (he is believed to have had cancer). But as a citizen of the UAE, there is no other connection to Morocco, nor are their al Qaeda operatives in the country who are connected to the 9/11 plot. It is possible that he flew the roundabout route to then fly home, but there is no evidence of that.

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed

 

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind behind 9/11, is identified by an al Qaeda captive from a photograph and labeled an “associate” of Osama bin Laden.

He is subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury the next month. The FBI and U.S. Attorney do not really know who KSM is, other than as a financier of the 1993 World Trade Center attack and an accomplice in Ramzi Yousef’s activities in the Philippines. The indictment is sealed—secret—only to be opened once KSM is in custody.

Gold Mohur Hotel

 

Probably the “first” direct attack by al Qaeda on the United States occurs in Yemen.

Two hotels that cater to westerners are attacked, one at the Movenpick and the other at the Gold Mohur. Though directed at U.S. military personnel staging for operations in Somalia, the bombs kill one Australian tourist. In fact, the U.S. military are staying at a completely different hotel and the attack is barely noticed in Washington.

Two Yemenis, later found to have trained in Afghanistan, are eventually arrested, having been injured in the blast. Osama bin Laden claimed responsibility for the attack in 1998.

South Yemen

 

Osama bin Laden approaches Prince Turki bin Faisal al Saud, head of the intelligence services of Saudi Arabia, with a plan to use Arab mujahedin from Afghanistan to overthrow the Marxist government in South Yemen.

Turki rejects his proposal, but bin Laden reportedly organizes fighters anyhow under the al Qaeda flag, and then (working with tribal leaders) makes a series of attacks in South Yemen. The attacks are so damaging and threatening that Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh travels to Saudi Arabia to ask King Fahd to get bin Laden under control. The King then himself instructs bin Laden to stay out of Yemeni affairs, and Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz al Saud (then the minister of the interior) demands bin Laden’s passport.

Less than a year later, Iraq invades Kuwait and bin Laden’s views of Saudi Arabia are forever transformed, with King Fahd inviting U.S. military forces to deploy to Saudi soil—a sacrilege to bin Laden that represents a new set of “crusaders” entering the lands of Islam.