The CIA produces a report on Osama bin Laden’s attempts to acquire uranium. It is based upon the interrogation of Jamal al-Fadl, a defector from bin Laden’s camp in Sudan. Al-Fadl claims to have personally been involved in missions to Angola and Tanzania to acquire the radioactive materials, and even to have worked on behalf of bin Laden to purchase Russian “loose nuke” materials or warheads on the open market.
The intelligence about al Qaeda’s WMD pursuits is electrifying in the secret corridors of power for two reasons. One because it is Washington’s obsession, and two, because WMD triggers covert authorities – including the authorization to use lethal force in apprehending bin Laden and a list of targeted associates – that are otherwise unavailable in going after state and non-state actors. If the target is killed in the process of capture, the CIA is covered by the new presidential authority.
In June 1998, based upon information from al-Fadl, who is first interrogated in Frankfurt until he is taken in witness protection in New Jersey, the CIA mounts an operation to collect a soil sample from an area close to al Shifa in Sudan, where al-Fadl claims that al Qaeda is using a pharmaceutical plant as cover to develop chemical weapons. After the African embassy bombings in August 1998, WMD plays an outsize role, the Clinton administration deciding to attack al Shifa as part of its retaliation.
Bin Laden’s entities in Sudan, George Tenet later wrote, were “not only were part of the terrorist financial network but also had possible connections with al-Qaeda attempts to obtain chemical and biological weapons.” (At the Center of the Storm, p. 115)
“They were willing to do what needed to be done, and pay whatever it would cost, to get their hands on fissile material,” Tenet wrote. “In the face of such steely resolve, the only responsible course of action would be to do whatever was necessary to rule out any possibility that terrorists could get their hands on fissile material.” (p. 261)